Linguistic deception of Chinese cyber fraudsters by Tan, Kim Hua et al.
3L: The Southeast Asian Journal of English Language Studies – Vol 23(3): 108 – 122 
http://doi.org/10.17576/3L-2017-2303-08 
	   108 
Linguistic Deception of Chinese Cyber Fraudsters 
 
 
TAN KIM HUA 
Sustainability of Language Sciences Research Centre, 
Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, 
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia 
 
MOHAMMAD ABDOLLAHI-GUILANI 
Buein Zahra Technical University,  
Buein Zahra, Qazvin, Iran 
abdollahi20@gmail.com 
 
CHEN CHEN ZI 
Independent Scholar, Xi’an,  
Shaanxi Province, China 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Cybercrimes are on the increase in China and ‘QQ’, an instant messenger platform, is frequently exploited for 
these crimes. Fraudsters manipulate language to deceive users into revealing their bank accounts or depositing 
sums in the cheats’ accounts. Employing the theoretical framework that includes Speech Act Theory and 
Politeness Theory, the researchers attempted to identify the strategies used by such fraudsters. The subjects of 
this study included 50 interlocutors who had already chatted with different online cheats and had a record of 
their conversations. The data were collected and analysed on the basis of the type of discourse themes 
displayed. Findings indicated that the chats displayed various themes like Business Invitation, Money Transfer, 
Account Hacking and Online Shopping. In addition, the three levels of speech acts of locutionary, illocutionary, 
and perlocutionary were discernible and most fraudsters did not bother to address face threatening acts. In 
comparison to hoax email writers, the fraudsters in instant communication regularly came across as more 
aggressive and imperative, but then softened their diction if victims were not interested to chat with them in real 
time. The implications of this study lie in the possibility of developing a model for fraudster or cheat discourse 
structure, thus alerting QQ users in particular of such crimes. Other online instant messenger users will also 
benefit from this study. Better informed of how cheats manipulate language to present untruth as truth and be 
alerted of the modus operandi involved in online deception, victims can be saved and the crime curbed.  The 
issue of the victim’s vulnerability and the reasons behind it certainly deserve further linguistic and 
metalinguistic scrutiny. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
People are reportedly said to be telling one to two lies per day on average. Therefore, 
deception is not an infrequent part of human communication. Additionally, research shows 
that lies also take place in computer-mediated communication (Hancock et al. 2008). With 
the development of the Internet, the network seems to become a new kind of crime tool, 
crime place and crime object (Guo 2011). Due to the increasing usability of the Internet, most 
communicators can remain anonymous and this has created new opportunities for deception 
and scams (Hancock 2007, Blommaert 2005). 
Statistics showed that in 2007 the number of Internet users in China exceeded 162 
million and 69.8% of them (over 113 million users) used Instant Messengers (IM) such as 
QQ, MSN Messenger, and Yahoo Messenger. Among these social networking platforms, 
QQ, developed by the Chinese company Tencent, currently occupies about 80.1% of the IM 
market share in China (CNNIC 2007, cited in Lu, Zhou & Wang 2009). 
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The popularity of QQ brings benefits not only to the Information Technology market, 
but also to the treacherous fraudsters or cheats around the Internet space. They manipulate 
this platform and figure out ways to make easy profits. Guo (2011), analysing the cases and 
summarising the main forms of Internet frauds, stated that in China, one of the most frequent 
cybercrimes is QQ hacking frauds. A lot of users claimed they fell into the “QQ-friends-
borrow-money” trap, and lent money to the so-called friends or relatives. This is the kind of 
fraud after QQ accounts were stolen. The cheats hacked someone’s QQ account, then 
impersonated as a relative or a known friend and successfully borrowed money. As QQ is an 
online chatting tool, the whole cheating process was done through conversation. Such 
cybercrime can also be seen as language crime, because it is executed via texts, and thus 
aptly studied from a linguistic perspective. 
With the anonymity provided by the Internet, users undertake false identities to 
engage in deceptive communication. Detecting deception is thus, difficult. Although 
electronic dictionaries have the technical ability of linking to an application and providing a 
platform for detecting the common terms used by fraudsters, as stated by Tan and Woods 
(2008), lexical items detection is rendered less useful unless the architecture of the whole 
cheat scheme is unravelled. It is, therefore, imperative to be aware of the linguistic 
architecture used and the intentions of fraudsters. 
As this study unravels the relationships between linguistic forms and the language 
users of these forms, people’s intended meanings, assumptions, and goals, as well as 
identifying the kinds of actions that they are performing while chatting are detected (Yule 
1998). Careful investigation is required to uncover the cheats’ devious intentions. It is 
essential to find out what kind of words cheats use when they attempt to deceive victims, and 
why the victims fall prey to cheats. More importantly, even if it were the victims’ friends or 
relatives who asked to borrow money, it is important to find out how the cheats could achieve 
the goal effortlessly. 
This study analysed the module of cheats’ language in deception by examining the 
following: 
 
1. The discourse structure of the QQ hacking frauds in the data 
2. Pragmatic strategies in the openings and closings of cheats’ speech as in greeting and 
politeness strategy. 
3. The way cheats perform speech acts at every phase of cheating within the conversation. 
 
In order to accomplish the above-mentioned objectives, the following research 
questions are brought into concern:  
 
1.  What types of discourse structures were applied in the data of QQ hacking frauds? 
2.  How did the cheats apply pragmatic strategies in the openings and closings? 
3. How did the cheats perform speech acts at every phase of cheating within the 
conversation? 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Of all human behaviours that are considered to breach conventions of social and 
communicative interaction, deception is one of the most pervasive and by far the most elusive 
(McCarthy, Duran, and Booker 2012). Deception is part of daily personal as well as business 
life and usually involves messages that are delivered in order to mislead others or to persuade 
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others to believe what is said, even if it is not true (Zhou et al. 2003, Hancock et al. 2004 
cited in Galanxhi & Nah 2007).  
The concept of deception is mundanely known as lie, cheat, or bluff. Xie and Lin 
(2005, as cited by Yao bin Lu et al. 2009) stated that lies are always defined as declarations 
that are intended to let others misunderstand, and to expect others to believe what is said; it is 
a violation of what is known to be true for the purpose of misleading, but seemingly 
trustworthy information (Ekman 1997, cited in McCarthy, Duran & Booker 2012). In this 
respect, Coleman and Kay (1981) argue that there are levels within lies; the action of lying is 
the surface of deceptive intention, and needs to fulfil three factors:  
 
a) the sender knows the statement is untrue,  
b) the sender intends to cheat the receiver  
c) the untruth of the sender’s declaration can be proven.  
 
The identity of the cheats largely affects victims’ level of acceptance; it is the first 
factor the cheats manipulate, because they are portraying the person that shares some 
relationship with the victims.  
According to Ekaning (2011), crimes that are formed through language can be studied 
from a different viewpoint. Language can form insult, threat, fraud, perjury, forged and fake 
advertisements, and plagiarism. Even crimes like theft, kidnapping and murder, which require 
language before realization, can be considered as language crimes. Through different cases 
such as e-mail scams and Instant Messenger traps, researchers explore how deception affects 
language use in text-based interactions in order to identify linguistic patterns and differentiate 
between deceptive and truthful electronic communication (Hancock et al. 2008). 
Zhou et al. (2002) mentioned two conceptions that reveal weaknesses in deception. One 
is language complexity while the other is language diversity. As a complex task, deception 
requires more cognitive processing than telling the truth. Faced with such cognitive 
challenges, deceivers have to monitor any suspicion aroused on the receiver’s side while 
communicating with them. However, it is likely that the cheats produce messages with lower 
language complexity for the complex task than truth-tellers do. The second feature, language 
diversity too, can probably betray cheats. The language used for describing fake events may 
fail to reflect the rich diversity of actual events because cheats usually lack truthful memory 
or experience. Literature suggests that cheats often display less diversity at both lexical and 
content levels (Zhou et al. 2002). 
Most researches focus on email hoaxes rather than conversational text-based frauds. 
The computer-mediated discourse of the conversation, which is produced when people 
interact with one another via networked computers, is text-based; messages are typed on a 
computer keyboard and read as text on a computer screen, typically by people at different 
locations (Herring, Stein & Virtanen 2013). Chiluwa (2009, 2010) stated that there is an 
increasing application of Internet resources especially emails in digital deceptions 
particularly financial scams. All forms of frauds on the Internet begin from the point of using 
language in a particular way, to persuade and eventually convince others. In the email hoax 
cases, all of Searle’s (1979) five categories of speech acts were performed in written texts. 
His analyses showed how the various communicative or persuasive strategies in the emails 
actually employed most or all of the speech acts such as requesting, greeting, and 
commanding. Studies (e.g., Blommaert 2005, Chiluwa 2010) on spam emails from a 
linguistic perspective revealed that the English proficiency of the writers of the deceptive 
email however, do not match their level of digital literacy. They displayed expertise in 
detecting victims but failed in some text structures such as normative codes of their 
addressees which resulted in misnomers.  
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The theory of discourse analysis applied here is one of strategy that views discourse as a 
social practice (Fairclough 1989). Computer-mediated communication in this context is such 
that all forms of communication or messages produced and transmitted through computer 
networks are viewed as discourses, revealing features of real life identities and dimensions of 
social practices. Because it focuses on language and language use in computer network 
environments, computer-mediated discourse analysis examines language use and how the 
different linguistic properties are influenced by their socio-cultural context. According to 
Herring (2001), computer-mediated discourse analysis will pay attention to how users of the 
networks do interactional work through text-based discourses, allowing them to negotiate, 
intimidate, joke and of course cheat and deceive.  
Based on the property of the emails, Chiluwa (2010) identified and classified cheat’s 
intentions into themes namely (i) money transfers, (ii) next-of-kin claims, (iii) fortune 
bequeathing, (iv) charity donations and (v) investment opportunity. The module of deception, 
following Chiluwa (2010) has the below discourse structure: 
 
1. Opening/greeting 
2. Introduction (including the identity of the writer and often an apology for making contact 
without prior notice) 
3. A narrative which includes a description of:  
(i) the origin of the money deposited in a foreign account in which the addressee is made a 
beneficiary;  
(ii) a painful experience of the death of a spouse and the money he kept in a dormant 
account abroad to be used for charity or for raising his kids;  
(iii) a story of a wealthy client who deposited some millions of dollars in a foreign account 
and had died, leaving the money for the addressee; or  
(iv) an investment opportunity abroad worth millions of dollars 
4. An invitation to the receiver to be engaged in the business with an offer of a profit-sharing 
formula 
5. Request for confidentiality or an invitation to the addressee to indicate interest 
6. Closing (pressing a request to the receiver to reply immediately) 
 
In addition to Chiluwa’s perspective, the speech act theory (Searle, 1979) and 
politeness theory supported and formed the framework of this study. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This study applied both a qualitative and quantitative research method to explore how people 
utilised language to achieve their goals. The content-based analysis approach is functional in 
decoding language used in the cheat’s discourse. According to Robichaud and Blevins 
(2011), the most fundamental form of content-based text analysis is that of counting words. 
In addition, content analysis allows the researcher to test theoretical issues to enhance 
understanding of the data (Satu & Helvi 2007). There are various elements in written 
messages that can be counted, such as words, themes, and items. In this study, several themes 
within the cheats’ speech were counted such as the way the interlocutors greeted and how 
often certain phrases appeared in a text. Concepts behind the cheats’ speech were also 
quantified, such as the speech acts they performed. Two theories, namely politeness strategy 
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and speech acts taxonomy, were used to analyse the data. Aspects of these theories decode 
what people have in mind when they use language for socialization. 
 
RESEARCH SAMPLE 
 
In this study, the participants were cyber interlocutors including those who were considered 
the victims of lies and cheats pretending to be the victims’ friends. In the researchers’ QQ 
friend list, there were 343 people. About 70% of them were the researchers’ relatives and the 
rest were just online friends whom the researchers did not know personally. Since not 
everyone had the experience of chatting with cheats, the researchers approached friends 
individually, and published announcements through QQ inquiring if anyone indeed had the 
experience of chatting with cheats and had records of the conversation. This was voluntary. 
During the consultation process, half of the QQ friends stated they did not save chatting 
records, and most of them had not chatted with cheats. However, from April 2016 to 
September 2016, 50 pieces of relevant conversation data were collected; this led to 50 victims 
and 50 cheats who contributed to the chatting records forming the corpus of the present 
study. Because all of the QQ hacking frauds happened in China, all the cheats were Chinese 
QQ software users, but their locations and genders were unknown. 
 
DATA COLLECTION METHOD 
 
When the researchers’ QQ friends agreed to contribute, they emailed the researchers a copy 
of their chatting records. Subsequently, the texts that the cheats and the victims typed out 
were translated from Chinese into English. The duration of each conversation ranged from 1 
minute to 10 minutes or more. Some of the conversations were monologues and contained 
only one turn, while some dialogues could reach up to tens of turns. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
According to the features of the conversations, four types of frauds were examined as given 
in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1. Types of conversation 
 
BI SO MT AH Total 
7 7 29 7 50 
 
Table 1 indicates that there are four types of conversation, namely business invitation 
(BI), help to do shopping online (SO), money transfer (MT), including money borrowing, 
money changing, and money keeping, and QQ account hacking (AH). The table shows that 
the highest frequency of conversation revolved around the subject of asking victims to 
transfer money to a certain account, but the other types each had 7 instances of occurrences. 
The first type which was business invitation often appeared as a poem-like 
monologue. The texts always started with some idioms or sayings to create a convincing and 
unforced atmosphere, and then developed into invitation to readers to join a chatting group or 
to add some QQ accounts as QQ friends. The context usually revolves around some quick 
ways of earning money, or developing chatting groups for making money. 
In the second type, shopping online, the cheats usually pretended to be the victims’ 
friends and requested for online shopping and then promised that once the transaction was 
done, they would return the money to the victims.  
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Money transfer was the third type of the cheats’ conversation. Here the cheats 
pretended to be the person whose QQ account was stolen, and requested the victims to 
deposit or transfer money to the cheats’ friends. This category was further subdivided into 
three types: Money Borrowing, Money Changing, and Money Keeping. 
In the Money Borrowing case, the cheats claimed the victims’ friends were in dire 
need of help and they asked the victims to lend them some money so that they could transfer 
that sum to their mutual friends’ accounts. The cheats offered a bank account which was 
either their own account or belonged to one of their accomplices. 
In the Money Changing case, the victims were overseas students’ parents or relatives. 
The cheats pretended to be those students and claimed that their classmates or friends around 
wanted to exchange currency with them. Some of the cheats also claimed that their friends 
had trouble in China, and hence urged the victims to transfer money to their friend’s relatives 
in China immediately. In these cases, the cheats assured they would return the money, too.  
In the Money Keeping cases, instead of borrowing or asking for money from the 
victims, the cheats claimed that they lost their personal bank card, so they wanted to transfer 
their money to the victims’ bank account. Meanwhile, they asked for the victims’ identity 
card number and bank card bound phone number. In such cases, the cheats would utilize the 
information they asked from the victims to open an online bank account. After that, the 
cheats would say that they had already made the deposit, and asked for a code to check 
whether the money was safe. Once the victims gave the cheats the code, all the money in the 
victims’ bank account would be taken by the cheats.  
The fourth type was account hacking. Here the victims were required to lend the 
cheats QQ accounts and passwords so that the cheats could test certain applications or play 
online games. Once the victims gave the cheats their passwords, the cheats would change the 
passwords immediately. Another way was that the cheats would request the victims to ‘help 
to vote for a friend in a competition’ by logging in to a website with the victims’ QQ 
accounts, and as soon as the victims logged in to the website, their passwords would be 
hacked by the cheats. 
Consulting the research contributors, the researchers managed to learn how many 
cheating attempts were successful as given in Table 2 below: 
 
TABLE 2. Successful and failed frauds 
 
 Data Frequency Rate% 
Successful frauds AH1-2, AH7, MT14-15, MT24-25, MT28-29, SO1-2 11 25.6 
Failed frauds AH3-6, MT1-13, MT16-23, MT 26-27, SO3-7 32 74.4 
Total 43 
 
Table 2 shows that except for business investment whose exact number of successful 
and failed fraud attempts could not be confirmed by the research contributors, the other cases 
indicated that the number of failures were almost three times higher than that of the successes 
(32 vs 11). In the table, the numbers appearing after the acronyms show the research subjects 
ID who were randomly listed. It shows that the successful cases in account hacking, money 
transfer and online shopping were 3, 6, and 2, respectively, while the results for the failed 
attempts included 4, 23, and 5 cases, respectively. 
 
ANALYSIS OF CHEATS’ TEXTS and DISCUSSION 
 
The collection of the cheats’ conversations with the cyber victims provided an opportunity to 
analyse the data in terms of forms and structures. The cheats’ behaviour showed that they 
would make up a story and ask for money, fix their lies when the victims suspected, and 
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eventually convinced victims into doing what they were asked to. Since the cheats were 
pretending to be the victims’ friends, they casually chatted with the victims, and so most of 
the conversations were structured as (i) opening, (ii) chatting, and (iii) closing. However, 
most of the conversations did not get a clear close at the end, because either the cheats were 
discovered by the victims at this stage or they urged the victims to take action.  
As for the type of the data, most of the AH and BI data were monologues which the 
cheats ended with some sentences or one paragraph. The cheats initially introduced their 
business or need for help, and directly required the victims to accept their requests, and then 
offered the benefits of such businesses. The cheats in these data did not repair their speech, 
nor close it either. Interestingly, in the AH and BI data, when some receivers were curious or 
raised questions about the cheats’ words, the cheats did not respond. The data indicated that 
all of the conversational frauds followed similar structures as follow: 
 
1. Opening 
2. Introduction about the purpose of chatting/pre-request 
3. Narrating the problem 
4. Officially requesting for help and making commitments to the victims 
5. Closing (the cheats urged the addressees to take action to help them, or they kept 
questioning whether the victims were done with their task) 
 
In conversational frauds, almost all the cheats started their talk by checking whether 
the victim was free to talk. Instead of greeting, most of them directly said ‘There?’ or ‘Are 
you there?’ While others were more direct and asked ‘Are you free to help me?’ or ‘Do you 
have a minute to help me?’ The most direct cheats said ‘Do you have an e-bank account’ or ‘I 
need you to help me to transfer money.’ Hence, it was observed that several cheats at this 
stage were very impatient. They had already stated their purposes or even problems before 
they received any response from the victims. After opening the conversation, the cheats 
began to introduce their purpose of chatting. Similarly, in the BI and SO data, except for 
several cheats who asked whether the victims owned an online bank account, other cheats 
directly explained the reason why they needed help. The reason could either be their 
friend/relative is in the hospital or they simply needed to transfer money to others. Most of 
the introductions of purpose are brief and ended with one sentence. 
While some of the cheats stated their problems at the introductory stage, the others 
followed certain steps and after telling the victims they needed help, they would begin to 
explain what kind of help they were seeking. Right after the problem was narrated, the cheats 
officially put their request forward. Then, no matter what kind of excuses the victims 
presented, the cheats promised they would return the money soon. In closing their 
conversation, however, the cheat did not follow what Sacks (1975, p. 76) said: “A single 
conversation does not simply end abruptly, but it should be brought to a close.” Therefore, 
when the conversation was going to end, the interlocutor should have signalled to their 
partners by saying ‘I’ll get back to you by tomorrow,’ or ‘I have to leave now.’ Nevertheless, 
in the data of this study, no obvious pre-closing was observed. This does not mean the cheats 
were being rude, but it was well planned to encourage a quick response from the victims. 
 
 
PRAGMATIC STRATEGIES 
 
Pragmatically, the first few items to look into the data were in terms of Face Threatening 
Acts (FTA) and Politeness Strategy. The purpose was to find out whether the cheats 
respected the victims’ expectations during the whole deception process. The need to be polite 
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can often account for why people choose to imply an idea rather than assert it directly (Peccei 
1999). The cheats in all 50 data pieces never implied what they wanted. They were direct in 
their requests and did not address or redress any FTA (Face threatening acts). The FTAs and 
Politeness Strategy are therefore worthy of identification and explanation. 
 
OPENING 
 
Among the four types of politeness strategy, the bald on record strategy was applied when 
there was no effort to minimize threats to the receiver’s face. The sender (cheats) performed 
direct speech acts containing imperatives with no mitigating device. This strategy was the 
most frequently applied strategy in this study.  
Forms of address/greetings are products of social recognition of the addressee’s age and 
social status. In most cultures, a greeting is a sign of politeness (Chiluwa 2009, Farashiyan & 
Tan 2012). And as Behnam and Amizadeh (2011) put it, compliments perform various 
functions but primarily and most obviously act as affective speech acts serving to increase or 
consolidate the solidarity between the speaker and the addressee. In the 50 QQ chatting 
records, no formal greetings were observed. Only in MT1, when the victim asked the cheat 
‘How’s life’, the cheat did answer ‘Life’s good’, but in the rest of the records, the cheats 
utterances were direct and straight on in the openings. There were many examples of the bald 
on record strategy in the data. The opening formula in MT data was categorized and counted 
as an instance in Table 3. 
 
TABLE 3. Opening formula in MT data 
 
 Opening/greeting formula Frequency % 
MT 1-2, 9, 11,13-14, 
16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 27, 
29 
Opening as ‘There?’ or ‘Are you there?’ 13 44.8 
MT 3, 6, 7, 12, 15, 
23, 28 
Opening as ‘Do you have a minute?’ ‘Are you free to help me?’ or ‘I 
need you to help me transfer some money’ 7 24.1 
MT4-5, 21, 24 Opening as ‘What are you doing?’ 4 13.8 
MT 8 Opening as sending video chat request 1 3.4 
MT 10 Opening as ‘Where are you?’ 1 3.4 
MT 18 Opening as ‘Do you have e-bank account?’ 1 3.4 
MT 25 Opening as ‘Dad. I carelessly dropped my phone in the toilet and it’s broken.’ 1 3.4 
MT 26 Opening as’ My purse is stolen, send me some money. My card number is xxxx’ 1 3.4 
Total 29  
 
As Table 3 shows, what 44.8% of the cheats cared about was whether their victims 
were online or was able to chat by asking ‘There?’ or ‘Are you there?’ The word ‘there’ is 
abrupt as an opener to a conversation, and was not minimizing threats to the receiver’s face at 
all. The data indicate that 13.8% of ‘What are you doing?’ and 3.4% of ‘Where are you?’ 
appeared hasty and abrupt as well. There is no respect or norms of address used; most of the 
cheats addressed the victims only as ‘You’ rather than by the victims’ names. 24.1% of the 
cheats directly asked their target whether they were free to offer help. And in MT3 and 12, 
the cheats asked ‘Do you have a minute? I need you to help me with something,’ and ‘Are 
you free to help me transfer money to my friend in China?’  
In MT18, the cheats asked the victim “Do you have an e-bank account?” which is a 
direct question asking for personal information. It was thus, threatening the victim’s negative 
face as well. To deal with this FTA, the cheats in MT18 pre-requested by saying that they had 
not asked for anything yet, and the victims at this point could refuse to answer but chose not 
to.  
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If FTA can be measured by size, then the largest size of FTA would be in MT26, ‘My 
purse is stolen, send me some money’. The cheat in this case uttered an imperative sentence, 
and it left little opportunity for the victim to reject the request. An imperative expression is 
always categorized as the bald on record strategy. And, the sentence ‘My card number is 
*******’ is right after the previous utterance; notably to convince the victim of the cheat’s 
intention. Though these words could increase the imposition on victims, it was working for 
the cheats. 
Generally, the cheats utilized the bald on record strategy at the opening stage. 
Depending on different contexts, some of the strategies may be labelled as positive politeness 
strategy, but most of the cheats threatened the victims’ negative face. 
A complete absence of formal address pattern and greetings is noticed throughout the 
data, and most utterances take the form of imperatives to constrain the victims and to show 
authority over the victims. To interpret the cheats’ politeness strategy, Brown and Levinson 
(1987) revealed that the bald on record strategy can also be oriented to saving the hearer’s 
face, because directness often indicates a wish to be seen as socially close. Hence, the cheats 
relied on the intimate relationship between the real account owners and their respective 
victims.  
 
INTRODUCTION ABOUT PURPOSE OF CHATTING/PRE-REQUEST 
 
After checking on whether the victims were willing to talk, in this phase, the cheats started to 
claim they had something to discuss with the victims. Most of them consulted the victims and 
checked whether they could offer help. Once the victims answered them, they performed the 
request directly and kept pretending to be intimate with the victims. 
As many of the cheats indicated to the victims that they were not in the QQ platform 
for chitchat, this part could be easily identified. Some of the cheats explained their purpose in 
the opening part, as in MT3, 6, 7, 12, and 15 as given in Table 3. In MT3, the cheat said ‘Do 
you have a minute? I need you to help me with something.’ The cheat in MT6 said ‘Are you 
free to help me transfer money to my friend who is in China?’ And in MT13, the cheat said, 
“Are you there? I have something urgent to tell you.’  
To state the purpose at the beginning of a conversation would impose pressure on the 
victims. Despite this, the cheats clearly spoke of their needs. This type of opening could be 
undesirable even unwelcome to the victims. Especially in MT13, the word ‘urgent’ forced the 
victims to pay attention. Besides, the statement in MT3 ‘I need you to help me’ appeared 
very haughty; and even if the cheats made up urgency, such an authoritative-like expression 
was inappropriate. Their acts undoubtedly threatened the victims’ negative face. Thus, at this 
stage, the cheats applied the bald on record strategy. 
 
PROBLEM NARRATION 
 
The third phase within the whole deception process was to narrate the problems. Some cheats 
reversed the sequence of the problem narration and officially made their requests at the onset, 
which meant some cheats would inform the victims of their problem from the very beginning. 
Others follow an abrupt lead in and then narrated their problems. But this difference in order 
would not affect the politeness strategy the cheats applied. What is notable is that this phase 
was vital to the cheats. After stating their purpose, the cheats would assert various problems 
they faced, and asked for the victims’ help. Table 4 categorises different types of problems 
that the cheats mentioned: 
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TABLE 4. Cheat’s problem types 
 
 Problem narration category Frequency % 
MT 3, 9, 23, 
26, 
Reasons related to ‘I don’t have enough money’  
 
4 13.8 
MT 1, 2, 4, 5-
8, 11-12, 15, 
17, 18, 20- 22, 
24, 28-29 
Reasons related to ‘My friend/relative needs money, but I’m too busy to leave/ I 
don’t have enough money’ or … 
‘My friend left foreign currency with me, he/she needs money now, but I’m not in 
China’ 
18 62 
MT 13-14, 16, 
19, 27, 
Reasons related to ‘I lost my bank card’.  5 17.2 
MT 25 Reasons related to ‘I need to pay my school fees’. 1 3 
MT 10 No reason is stated 1 3 
 
Table 4 illustrates the distribution of the problem types. Around 62% of the cheats 
stated their friends or relatives needed money, but due to certain reasons, they could not assist 
them. Although 13.8% of the cheats said they needed money themselves, 17.2% of them gave 
the same excuse but in a more stern tone. Only one cheat asked money for school fees and 
talked to the father of the original account owner and this was an isolated case. The cheat in 
MT10 was the only one that did not state any reason. 
Except for the MT data, the cheats in the AH data also stated their problems; the cheat 
in AH1 said ‘I’m helping my friend to test an online game and I need a QQ account…’ and 
the cheat in AH2 said ‘My friend joined Tencent New Silk Road Model competition…’ 
These two cheats made their requests right after stating their reasons for chatting. In AH3, the 
cheat said ‘…Is she your classmate? I heard she is abroad? Where did you take the 
convocation photo? ...’ to hint he/she has lost contact with ‘her’ in the speech. All the BI data 
were like advertisements, and the cheats mentioned standard words such as ‘vacancy’ and 
‘needed’, and thus, did not arouse the suspicions of the victims.  
The problem narration stage served as pre-request, and what the cheats expressed here 
was paving the way for the official request. Hence, it could be seen that all the cheats at this 
stage were performing the off-record strategy as they were going to threaten the victims’ 
negative face, and further explanation would ‘soften’ the threats. 
 
OFFICIAL REQUEST AND COMMITMENT 
 
Most of the FTAs occurred in the official request and commitment stage, and this stage is 
considered the most ‘offensive’ stage. In contrast to the off-record strategy, there is more 
application of positive politeness as well as negative politeness on record and especially bald 
on record strategies. Although the cheats were the ones who were in need of help, most of 
requests were bold and without constraint. Table 5 presents the phrases cheats used in their 
requests: 
 
TABLE 5. Cheats’ request phrases 
 
Data Cheats’ expression in request and promise 
SO1 Help me buy something online, I’ll return you the money later. 
SO2 I want to buy something. Can you help me? 
SO3 Help me buy antivirus software 
SO4 Can you help me buy several cards? Help me buy online 
SO5 I’m purchasing something online. Can you help me pay for it? I’ll return you the money tomorrow. 
SO6 Help me purchase something. 
SO7 Ok, I want to purchase something, help me pay the bill, and I will return you the money by tomorrow, 
 
Table 5 shows that each cheat’s first-time request started with ‘Can you help....’ 
which appeared 3 times but a direct request, ‘Help me ....’ appeared 4 times. No tact in the 
choice of language such as ‘Would you please’ or ‘Thank you’ were discernible in the cheats’ 
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speech. This kind of offensive request may have threatened the victims’ negative face. In 
addition, there was no expression of gratitude or apology in any of the phases of the requests.  
The cheats in SO3, SO4, and SO6 did not make any commitment to the victims, the 
victims in SO4 and SO6 discovered the cheats’ identity, while the victim in SO3 was not 
capable of offering any help. Except for the cheat in SO2 who made commitment after 
various requests, the remaining 3 cheats made their commitments right after they make 
requests from the victims. The statement ‘I will return the money tomorrow/later’ meant to 
urge the victims to take action; thus, it was threatening the victims’ positive face. 
In contrast, the statement ‘Can you help’ came across as less direct than ‘Help me ...’, 
when the people directly expressed their needs; it can technically be described as being on 
record (Yule 1998), whereas the words ‘Help me …’ without using any terms of address for 
the victims can be seen as an imperative, so it is known as bald on record. Bald on record 
with direct command forms would be misleading, because imperative forms are often used by 
close acquaintances without being interpreted as commands (Yule 1998). The cheats’ speech 
showed the cheats were either being very strategically aggressive or they lack politeness 
strategy.  
 
CLOSING 
 
Based on the observation of the 50 pieces of data, the last phase of the whole cheating 
process is closing. Unlike in emails, there is no proper closure by the cheats in this study. 
None of the cheats said or implied farewell to the victims. There were closing utterances to 
indicate farewell such as ‘Thank you for helping me’ or ‘I’ll talk to you later.’  
In most of the MT and SO data, the cheats were busy urging the victims to offer help, 
or questioning whether the victims were done with their tasks. Thus, the closing stage may be 
considered as the expansion of the request. In the BI data, the monologue ended with 
invitation codes to make their words more believable and formal. The AH data usually ended 
with the QQ account information given freely to the cheats. Because of the various 
expressions and attitudes that the cheats presented at this phase, it was sometimes hard to 
categorize their speech. In these cases, the cheats acted like they had the right to give orders 
to the victims; in fact, their request was an intrusion into the victims’ privacy and void of 
respect. Due to the fact that the language that cheats used was direct and face threatening, the 
politeness strategies applied in this stage were largely bald-on record and less, on record 
strategies. 
 
SPEECH ACTS 
 
In attempting to decode how the cheats proceeded with their deceptive behaviour, the 
researchers studied the speech acts of the cheats’ utterances. 
 
OPENING 
 
At this stage, their speech acts mostly were questioning, ordering, and requesting. Rather than 
simply making a request, in the data of MT and SO, almost all of the cheats made pre-
requests. Here are some examples: 
 
(SO4) There? Do you have an e-bank? 
(SO6) Did you open an online bank? 
(SO7) Do you have an online bank account? 
(MT4) Mom, what are you doing? 
(MT20) There? What are you doing bro? 
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The data indicate that 44.8% of the cheats cared about whether their target was online 
or was able to chat by asking ‘There?’ or ‘Are you there?’ Examples above show another 
kind of opening: these cheats either questioned the victims’ privacy or their activity at the 
moment. The surface act the cheats performed was questioning. However, their intention was 
not just asking a question but inviting the receiver to join the conversation. Therefore, the 
cheats’ illocutionary acts can be seen as inviting. After they’ve performed the action of 
inviting, the perlocutionary act they would receive was a response from the victims. 
As Austin (1962) defined, illocutionary act refers to speaker’s intention in producing 
an utterance, and perlocutionary act is the effect of the utterance uttered to the hearer. Each of 
the cheats’ speech was multifunctional, and simultaneously was preparing for further 
conversation. Their directive and expressive acts affected the victim in such a way that they 
became concerned about the issues the cheats made up, and the fact that the issues were 
serious and urgent. For example: 
 
(AH2) By the way, can you help me for two minutes? 
(SO1) Have you a registered Visa card and e-Bank?  
(SO2) I want to ask you something. Can you shop online? 
 
NARRATION OF THE PROBLEMS 
 
After introducing their purpose, the cheats would point out various problems hindering them 
from transferring money. According to Chiluwa (2010), in pragmatic theory, every 
sentence/utterance has implied meaning, and it is quite easy to see how the cheats performed 
representative acts while narrating long stretches of events.  
Among the 29 pieces of MT data, 66% of the cheats chose excuses such as their 
friends or relatives were in trouble, and that they did not have enough money or they could 
not leave at the moment; hence, they needed the victim to help them. These cheats’ 
illocutionary speech acts were directives and representatives, specifically in claiming, stating, 
requesting, and convincing. The following 17% data referred to another excuse which was 
‘lost personal bank card,’ and they wanted to transfer their money to the victim. Rather than 
borrowing money from the victims, the cheats wanted to give money to the victims. 
Nevertheless, they actually intended to get the victims’ personal information such as bank 
account number, IC number, as well as phone number. Therefore, directive and 
representative speech acts were observed.  
 
OFFICIAL REQUEST AND COMMITMENT 
 
The official request and commitment stage was the stage of directive and commissive speech 
act and the cheats directly asked the victims to transfer money, or requested them to do things 
they wanted. Accordingly, the cheats made a series of requests because the victims might 
hesitate to offer help. Some of the cheats made the requests first and then promised they 
would return the money, whereas the others would commit first and then kept urging the 
victims to take action. Whether or not the victims were willing to help, the cheats consistently 
showed their commitment by saying they would return the money.  
 
(AH1) Lend your QQ account to me for a while ok? Just two minutes. 
(AH2) Help me to vote for her. 
(AH3) Open the website I sent to you, there are some of her photos, the convocation photos. 
(MT2) How much money do you have now? Do you have 5000? 
(MT3) I want you to help me transfer some payment.  
(MT6) I’ll give you my internal friend’s card account, and you help me to deposit the money. My friend needs the money 
now. What kind of bank do you have near your house? 
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The cheats’ speech showed that they did not use words such as ‘please’ or ‘thank you’ 
at all; they made their impatient requests with a sense of urgency. They typed sentences like 
‘Just help me to deposit the money,’ and ‘Help me to vote for her.’ However, the person that 
the cheat pretended to be was of equal social status with the victims. In this sense, the cheats 
were just emphasizing their solidarity. Some of the cheats made promises right after they 
requested for money, while others promised the victims after several turns in the 
conversation. When the victims said that they did not have enough money or they were busy, 
the cheats would keep on resorting to the speech acts of performing, convincing, requesting, 
comforting and slightly threatening the victims. Instances are shown below: 
 
(AH1): Is that OK?! You don’t need to close your QQ, you can still chat with your friends, I just need two minutes.  
(MT2): I’ll return you the money later  
(MT 3): I will return the money the day after tomorrow. Yep, no worries just help me to deposit 3000 yuan sharp.  
 
CLOSING 
 
Closing and sign offs generally perform expressive speech acts (Chiluwa 2010). Based on the 
observation of the 50 pieces of data, the last phase of the whole cheating process was closing. 
Unlike writing an email, not all the cheats closed the conversation officially. Most of the 
cheats did not say goodbye to the victims; there was no such statement as ‘Thank you for 
helping me’ or ‘I’ll talk to you later.’ In the BI data, the monologue ended with an invitation 
code to make their intention believable and formal.  
 
(BI 1) Invitation code: 557 
(BI 2) And the invitation code of our group is 382. Without invitation code, it is prohibited to join! 
(BI6) Required code: 333 (compulsory) 
 
Except for SO2, MT15, and MT25, the rest of the cheats were all seen through at this 
stage, and they realized that the victims were not going to send the money to them. 
Interestingly, they still insisted on convincing rather than giving up. Noticeably, the cheats 
who succeeded in cheating were concerned about being informed by the victims of the status 
of the money transfer, and they focused on ‘After you have transferred the money, tell me 
online.’ And the cheats who failed in deception would keep emphasizing the problem, and 
attempted to regain the victims’ trust. Their illocutionary acts were still convincing, 
requesting, and threatening. An emphasis on the seriousness of the problem could startle the 
victim and encourage them to offer help. In SO2, the victim believed the cheat; therefore, the 
cheat’s request to be informed when shopping was done was fulfilled as a directive speech 
act. Consequently, because this phase was the expansion of the official request phase, the 
directive speech acts still rank highest among the speech acts. 
 
  
FURTHER DISCUSSION 
 
Focusing on how people are deceived into revealing their bank details or transferring money 
to the cyber cheats’ accounts, the researchers collected 50 instances of online conversations 
of such nature between the cheats and victims. Since the source texts were in Chinese, the 
whole discourse was translated into English and then was examined from different aspects. 
For example, it was explored how the framing of each discourse structure took, what speech 
acts were employed and what strategies were used to win the victims’ trust.  
The data showed that all the cheats knew how to create a friendly chatting atmosphere 
in order to win trust. Generally, the cheats’ flow of modus operandi starts with making up a 
story and asking for money, fixing their lies when the victims raised doubts, and eventually 
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convincing the victims into doing what they wanted. Since the cheats were pretending to be 
the victims’ friends, the chats were casual. Although most of the conversations were 
structured as (i) opening, (ii) chatting, and (iii) closing, many of them did not get a clear close 
at the end, either because the cheats were discovered by the victims at this stage or they urged 
the victims to take action, bringing the conversation to an abrupt end. Given this, the cheats 
had cleverly planned the frauds and used language in a particular way to deceive the victims.  
Pragmatically, there was no effort provided to minimize threats to the receiver’s face 
as there were no mitigating devices employed. The data indicated that there was a complete 
lack of formal address pattern and greetings, and most utterances took the form of the 
imperatives to constrain the victims. In addition, the speech acts as formulated by Searl (1979) 
were identified in the cheats’ discourse. They included expressive, representative, 
commissive and directive acts.  
Referring to the study conducted by Maros and Rosli (2017) which focused on the 
employment of politeness strategies in Twitter updates and found that positive politeness to 
be the most frequently used politeness strategy by female Twitter users, the present research 
revealed that this strategy was common as well, particularly in the opening messages.  
Similar to hoax emails, this study showed pragmatic strategies both in structure and 
content of the chatting records, which indeed had an impact on cheats’ acts of requesting. To 
compare with the hoax email writers, the cheats in instant communication appeared more 
aggressive and imperative. This feature can also be spotted in the study conducted by Kiang 
(2003), who made use of a corpus comprising 102 electronic mail messages from the 
executives' routine communication in work contexts where there was a predominance of main 
clauses in imperative and declarative moods, and subordinate clauses denoting purpose and 
reason. This may reflect that e-mail communication of the community is used more for 
requesting and informing, and less for enquiring unlike instant messaging. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study has demonstrated that a certain discourse pattern on the way cheats or fraudsters 
follow to steal money is discernible and the language they use is formulaic. The findings 
contribute substantially towards developing a model of cheat discourse structure, which can 
possibly raise awareness among cyber users of such rampant crimes. It should also be 
emphasised that the victim’s vulnerability to such lies and the reasons behind them deserve a 
closer examination by language scholars and the cyber community at large.  
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